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21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

tional defect by which he is not prejudiced. In a revocation proceeding it will be rare indeed that the person charged has to rely for
his defence upon the testimony of unwilling witnesses; normally it
is the testimony on behalf of the state that may stand .in need of
compulsory process, and if it does, the case for the state will be apt
to be weak. Except in cases of investigations, it is the opportunity
to be heard and to hear the evidence on the other side, not the right
to compulsory
testimony
counts in administrative proceedings.
However, the
decisionthat
calls attention to the desirability of two
general statutory provisions: the one, authorizing and requiring
administrative bodies or officials, in connection with determinations
adverse to private right, to take all necessary proof; the other,
giving them for that purpose the necessary testimonial powers and
the right to apply to a court to enforce obedience, if necessary.
ERNST FREUND.
AGENCY-POWER TO CONFESS JUDGMENT-INSANITY OF MAKER.

-[Illinois]
May 1, 1920, George F. Hoots and his wife, Mabel, executed a note with a power of attorney to confess judgment "in the
usual form of such powers used by banks." Hoots was adjudicated
insane July 30, 1920, and the appointed conservator took possession
of R-oots' property. The bank had judgment entered by confession in
circuit court August 10, 1920, against George and Mabel. County
court decreed sale of Hoots' land November 3, 1920. Daily purchased and subsequently conveyed to complainant who filed bill for
declaration that the judgment was void. Held bill dismissed, reversing decree of circuit court which had been affirmed by appellate
court.'
The well considered opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois followed the authority under the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence reversing the poorly considered opinion of the appellate court
to the contrary. 2 The latter court failed to make a distinction between a naked power or ordinary agency and a power given as security or, as more frequently expressed, coupled with an interest. Only
one case of a power to confess judgment where confession was had
after insanity of the maker has been found.3 There are other
decisions, however, that hold that insanity does not end a power that
is "coupled with an interest." 4 The result is desirable. The law of
l. Johnson v. Notional Bank of Mattoon (1926) 151 N.E. 231.
2. Johnson v. National Bank of Mattoon (1925) 237 Ill. App. 233.
3. Spencer v. Reynolds (1890) 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 249.
4. Berry v. Skinner (1869) 30 Md. 567 (power of sale in mortgage not
revoked by adjudication and appointment of committee); Meyer v. Kiuechler
(1881) 10 Mo. App. 371 (similar except adjudication occurred after sale under
deed of trust); VanMeter v. Darroh (1892) 115 Mo. 153, 22 S. W. 30 (adjudication before sale under deed of trust) ; Laughlin v. Hibben (1891) 129 Ind.
5, 27 N. E. 753 (foreclosure by suit) ; Hill v. Day (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 150
(power to pledge mortgage) ; Powell v. Batchelor (1915) 192 Mo. App. 67,
I. c. 74, 179 S. W. 751, noted in U. of Pa. L. R. 64: 397 (power to dispose
of business). Contrast Encking v. Simmons (1871) 28 Wis. 272 (circumstances may make sale fraudulent). See also Davis v. Lane (1839) 10 N. H.
156; Matthiessen v. McMahon (1876) 38 N. J. L. 536.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES'

agency should serve decent business practice. It would be highly
undesirable if insanity or the adjudication thereof made a power to
confess a judgment unavailable. In the principal case the judgment
was entered long before the sale was made under the order of
the county court.
It does not appear that the conservator of George F. I-Toots
was served with notice to appear in circuit court at the time of entering the judgment. One may venture to think that this was not done
since no mention is made and since the judgment was taken "in vacation." No ruling as to the necessity for this has been found. It
would be an added protection if it were required."
If Hoots had died it is stated in the opinion under review that
no judgment could have been taken against him. It is not believed
that the court meant by this that the power would have been revoked
by Hoots' death but that in such event it would have been necessary
to have summoned his personal representative into court and to
have taken judgment against him. In Fuller v. Jocelyn' a judgment
was entered against the principal on a warrant of attorney after his
death. This was not known to the court at the time, but was called
to its attention upon motion to set aside the judgment. The court
refused to do so on the unsatisfactory ground that "being the course
of the court to enter the judgments as of the first day of the term,
that
they could not alter it on
7 consideration of the circumstances
attend a particular case."
It is generally, but not universally, held that death does not
end a power of sale in a mortgage." Reilly v. Phillips9 was such a
No
case and in addition the dead mortgagor left minor heirs.
guardian was appointed for them and no notice was given to them
otherwise than by the customary publication. It was held that the
sale under the power was valid.1 0
However closely insanity may resemble death, the analogy is
not aided by the troublesome fiction of "civil death" which was
rejected as a basis for refusing to enter a judgment in Spencer v.
KENNETH C. SEARS.
"Reynolds, supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCEss-TAxATION-INHERITANCE TAX ON SHARES IN FOREIGN CORPORATION OWNED BY NON-

DECEDENT- [United States] The case of Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton1 decided by the federal Supreme
Court last spring finally settles a question much mooted in recent
years. One of the alleged grievances of some of our western and
5. Cf. Lundberg v. Davidson (1898) 72 Minn. 49, 74 N.W. 1018 (sale
RESIDENT

under power while mortgagor was insane; guardian ad litem unnecessary).
6. (1730) 2 Strange 882.
7. Cf. Lanning v. Pawson (1861) 38 Pa. 480.
8. Mechem "Agency" sec. 659; Tiffany "Agency" (2d ed.) sec. 88.
9. (1894) 4 S.D. 604, 57 N.W. 780.
10. See Tracey v. Lawrence (1854) 2 Drewry 403. See also Grandin v.
Emmons (1901) 10 N.D. 223, 86 N.W. 723.
1. (1926) 46 S. Ct. 256.

